
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20 Massachusetts Avc., N.W., MS 2090 Washington, DC 20529-2090 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration



PUBLIC COPY

Date:

MAN 17 2012

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION:

Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced

Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

SELF REPRESENTED

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Perry Rhew

Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The Director, Texas Service Center, denied the preference visa petition on February 5, 2007. The petitioner filed a motion to reopen on March 2, 2007. The director reaffirmed his decision on October 30, 2008. The petitioner filed an appeal with the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on November 28, 2008. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a computer consulting business. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a senior programmer/analyst pursuant to section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2). As required by statute, an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, which the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) approved, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director also determined that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary possessed the requisite five years of experience in the proffered position before the priority date of October 3, 2005. The director denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, the petitioner submits a letter, information regarding the petitioner's ability to pay, and letters regarding the beneficiary's prior work experience. The AAO will conclude that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate its continued ability to pay from the priority date onwards, but that the petitioner has demonstrated that the beneficiary possessed the requisite experience for the position.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Act provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a U.S. academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further states: "A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a U.S. doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree." *Id*.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment

Certification, as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was filed on October 3, 2005. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$65,000.00 per year. The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree in computers, mathematics, science, or engineering or its foreign equivalent and five years of experience in the proffered position.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the petition, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 1998 and to employ 17 workers currently. According to the tax return in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on July 17, 2006, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner since March of 2005.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 alien employment certification application establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. See Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); see also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. See Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage during any relevant timeframe including the period from the priority date in 2005 or subsequently. The petitioner submitted Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form W-2 Wage and Tax statements from the petitioner to the beneficiary for years 2005 and 2006 in the amounts of \$44,000.40 and \$59,382.73 respectively. Since the proffered wage is \$65,000.00 per year, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the beneficiary the difference between wages actually paid and the proffered wage, which is \$20,999.60 and \$5,617.27 for those years.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Taco Especial v. Napolitano, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010). Federal courts have upheld the use

of federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). See Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross sales and profits and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross sales and profits exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. See Taco Especial v. Napolitano, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

The record before the director closed on January 23, 2007 with the receipt by the director of the petitioner's submissions in response to the director's Notice of Intent to Deny (NOID). As of that date, the petitioner's 2006 federal income tax return was not yet due. Therefore, the petitioner's income tax return for 2005 is the most recent return available. The petitioner's tax return demonstrates its net income for 2005, as shown in the table below.

In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net income of -\$40,087.00.¹

Therefore, for 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net income to pay the difference between wages actually paid and the proffered wage.

As an alternate means of determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, USCIS may review the petitioner's net current assets. Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation's year-end current assets are shown

Where an S corporation's income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 21 of page one of the petitioner's IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 17e of Schedule K. See Instructions for Form 1120S, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1120s.pdf (accessed November 7, 2011) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders' shares of the corporation's income, deductions, credits, etc.). Because the petitioner had additional contributions, depreciation, and expenses shown on its Schedule K for 2005, the petitioner's net income is found on Schedule K of its tax return.

²According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities,

on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets. The petitioner's tax return demonstrates its end-of-year net current assets for 2005, as shown in the table below.

• In 2005, the Form 1120S stated net current assets of -\$129,036.00.

Therefore, for 2005, the petitioner did not have sufficient net current assets to pay the difference between wages actually paid and the proffered wage.

Therefore, from the date the DOL accepted the ETA Form 9089 for processing, the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, its net income, or its net current assets.

USCIS electronic records show that the petitioner filed approximately 128 other Form I-140 and Form I-129 petitions, which have been pending during the time period relevant to the instant petition. If the instant petition were the only petition filed by the petitioner, the petitioner would be required to produce evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition. However, where a petitioner has filed multiple petitions for multiple beneficiaries which have been pending simultaneously, the petitioner must produce evidence that its job offers to each beneficiary are realistic, and therefore that it has the ability to pay the proffered wages to each of the beneficiaries of its pending petitions, as of the priority date of each petition and continuing until the beneficiary of each petition obtains lawful permanent residence. See Matter of Great Wall, 16 I&N Dec. at 144-145 (petitioner must establish ability to pay as of the date of the Form MA 7-50B job offer, the predecessor to the ETA Form 750 and ETA Form 9089). See also 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). The record in the instant case contains no information about the proffered wage for the beneficiaries of those petitions, about the current immigration status of the beneficiaries, whether the beneficiaries have withdrawn from the visa petition process, or whether the petitioner has withdrawn its job offers to the beneficiaries. Furthermore, no information is provided about the current employment status of the beneficiaries, the date of any hiring, and any current wages of the beneficiaries. Since the record in the instant petition fails to establish the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the single beneficiary of the instant petition, it is not necessary to consider further whether the evidence also establishes the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage to the beneficiaries of the other petitions filed by the petitioner or to other beneficiaries for whom the petitioner might wish to submit Form I-140 petitions based on the same approved ETA Form 9089 alien employment certification.

inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such as accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The petitioner states on appeal that the beneficiary began working for the petitioner in March 2005. who had been performing the duties of the proffered The petitioner states that position, trained the beneficiary until July 2005 when the beneficiary took over the position. The petitioner claims that the beneficiary replaced in July 2005 and that the AAO should consider the \$35,809.90 in wages that the petitioner paid to in 2005. The record of proceeding does not, however, verify full-time employment or provide evidence sufficiently demonstrating that the petitioner is replacing beneficiary. In general, wages already paid to others are not available to prove the ability to pay the wage proffered to the beneficiary at the priority date of the petition and continuing to the present. Moreover, there is no evidence that the position of involves the same duties as those set forth on the ETA Form 9089. The petitioner has not sufficiently documented the position, duty, and termination of the worker who performed the duties of the proffered position. If that employee performed other kinds of work, then the beneficiary could not have replaced him or her. Furthermore, when the beneficiary and work for the petitioner during those three months in 2005 did overlap, they did not hold the exact same position.

The petitioner submitted an audited financial statement for 2005. The AAO notes that the statement reflects that the petitioner maintained \$469,942.00 in net income for that year whereas the tax return had stated that the petitioner instead maintained -\$40,087.00 in net income for that year. The petitioner submitted a Summary of Operations with the audited financial statement that claimed that the company uses the accrual basis of accounting for generating financial statements and the cash basis of accounting for its taxes.

The petitioner prepared its tax returns pursuant to the cash method of accounting, in which revenue is recognized when it is received, and expenses are recognized when they are paid. See http://www.irs.gov/publications/p538/ar02.html#d0e1136 (accessed November 29, 2011 and incorporated into the record of proceeding). This office would, in the alternative, have accepted tax returns prepared pursuant to accrual method of accounting, if those were the tax returns the petitioner had actually submitted to the IRS.

This office is not, however, persuaded by an analysis in which the petitioner, or anyone on its behalf, seeks to rely on tax returns or financial statements prepared pursuant to one method, but then seeks to shift revenue or expenses from one year to another as convenient to the petitioner's present purpose. If revenues are not recognized in a given year pursuant to the cash accounting method then the petitioner, whose taxes are prepared pursuant to cash rather than accrual, and who relies on its tax returns in order to show its ability to pay the proffered wage, may not use those revenues as evidence of its ability to pay the proffered wage during that year. Similarly, if expenses are recognized in a given year, the petitioner may not shift those expenses to some other year in an effort to show its ability to pay the proffered wage pursuant to some hybrid of accrual and cash accounting.³ The amounts shown on the petitioner's tax returns shall be considered as they were submitted to the IRS, not as amended pursuant to the petitioner's adjustments.

³ Once a taxpayer has set up its accounting method and filed its first return, it must receive approval from the IRS before it changes from the cash method to an accrual method or vice versa. See

The petitioner also submitted an unaudited financial statement from 2006. The petitioner's reliance on unaudited financial records is misplaced. The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) makes clear that where a petitioner relies on financial statements to demonstrate its ability to pay the proffered wage, those financial statements must be audited. As there is no accountant's report accompanying this statement, the AAO cannot conclude that it is an audited statement. Unaudited financial statements are the representations of management. The unsupported representations of management are not reliable evidence and are insufficient to demonstrate the ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner has additionally submitted its bank account statements from 2005 and 2006. The petitioner's reliance on the balances in its bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the petitioner's taxable income (income minus deductions).

The petitioner's assertions on appeal cannot be concluded to outweigh the evidence presented in the tax return as submitted by the petitioner that demonstrates that the petitioner could not pay the proffered wage from the day the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by the DOL.

USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. See Matter of Sonegawa, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967). The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in Time and Look magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in Sonegawa was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere. As in Sonegawa, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In the instant case, the petitioner only paid \$1,287,634.00 in wages in 2005 despite the high number of petitions that it filed following the priority date. The petitioner also failed to demonstrate sufficiently that the beneficiary was replacing employee Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

The ETA Form 9089 states that the position requires a bachelor's degree in computers, mathematics, science, or engineering or its foreign equivalent and five years of experience in the proffered position. The director determined that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate that the beneficiary possessed the requisite five years of experience in the proffered position before the priority date of October 3, 2005. On appeal, the AAO finds that the petitioner has submitted sufficient evidence in the form of signed employment letters, which demonstrate that the beneficiary possessed over five years of experience in the proffered position before the priority date. The petitioner submitted letters from

fully documenting over four years of the beneficiary's prior work experience, consistent with the alien employment certification. The petitioner submitted an additional letter from documenting that the beneficiary worked there from 1997 to 2000. Contrary to the decision of the director, the AAO finds that the beneficiary possessed the requisite post-baccalaureate experience for the position before the priority date.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.